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Abstract
This rejoinder responds to criticisms by Jan Klabbers and Ino Augsberg of The New
Legal Realist Approach to International Law (Leiden Journal of International Law, vol.
28:2, 2015). The new legal realism brings together empirical and pragmatic
perspectives in order to build theory regarding how law obtains meaning, is
practiced, and changes over time. Unlike conceptualists, such as Augsberg, legal
realists do not accept the priority of concepts over facts, but rather stress the
interaction of concepts with experience in shaping law’s meaning and practice.
Klabbers, as a legal positivist, questions the value of the turn to empirical work and
asks whether it is a fad. The rejoinder contends that the new legal realism has deep
jurisprudential roots in Europe and the United States, constituting a third stream of
jurisprudence involving the development of socio-legal theory, in complement with,
but not opposed to, analytic and normative theory.
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I thank Ino Augsberg and Jan Klabbers for their engagement with the new
legal realist approach to international law, which was the subject of the last issue of
the Leiden Journal of International Law that I organized and to which I contributed.1
To recall, the new legal realism is part of a third stream of jurisprudence distinct
from normative theorizing of law and analytic jurisprudence, that of socio-legal
theory. Rather than addressing traditional abstract jurisprudential questions such
as the concept of law (in analytic jurisprudence) or the relation of law to morals (in
natural law theory and Dworkin’s interpretive theory), the new legal realism
investigates three interrelated questions regarding law’s operation — how law
obtains meaning, is practiced (the law-in-action), and changes over time. The new
legal realism is thus distinct from both conceptualism (advanced by Augsberg) and
formal positivist understandings of law (advanced by Klabbers) because it asks
questions that these approaches do not and cannot answer. The different
approaches are not opposed, as I explained in my initial article, and should be
careful not to talk past each other. Augsberg and Klabbers assume the internal
perspective of formal legal arguments before a judge. New legal realists, in contrast,
apply an external perspective of how law operates in practice, including to inform
our understanding from an internal perspective. Such an approach is useful not only
for lawmakers who adopt new law, but also for legal practitioners advancing
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particular cases under existing law. Such an approach contributes to our knowledge
about law’s relation to social and political processes. Given international law’s
expanding scope across domains of social life,2 a new legal realist approach is
particularly called for today.
New legal realism, especially of the American variant,3 brings together two
key perspectives regarding law’s operation, one largely backward-looking (that of
empiricism) and one largely forward-looking (that of philosophical pragmatism).
The new legal realism thus stresses the importance of theory that is not modeldriven, but rather problem-oriented, engaging with experience in the world and
purposive interventions in it through law. Empirical study is important, as
pragmatists stress, because knowledge and learning develop from experience, not
from a priori logic, and because decision-making should be grounded in such
knowledge. Pragmatism is important for its understanding of human fallibility so
that we are not trapped by our conceptual priors, and in its problem-centeredness
since we have no choice but to use the best evidence available for our interventions
in the world.
Augsberg and Klabbers question the new legal realist approach from two
vantages. Augsberg raises a theoretical question regarding whether there is a
contradiction between empiricism (which he grounds in scientific realism from a
philosophical perspective) and pragmatism (with its problem-orientation and
distrust of claims of universal truth). Klabbers, a legal positivist, appears to question
the usefulness of an empirical approach to law and legal questions, suggesting that
the new legal realism is yet another academic fashion that will pass into the
graveyard of fashions.
Augsberg, in his response, Some Realism About New Legal Realism: What’s
New, What’s Legal, What’s Real?, questions whether the two roots of the new legal
realism—empiricism and philosophical pragmatism—are “mutually exclusive.” He
suggests they are because the first is based on an understanding that “reality exists
independently from our means of cognition, though we may not easily identify it,”
and the second contends that “what counts as ‘truth,’ ‘objectivity’ or reality has to be
analyzed against the functional background in which these concepts are used.”4He
draws upon philosophically challenging lines of criticism leveled against empiricism,
in particular.
There are at least three responses to Augsberg’s contentions. First, one does
not have to be a scientific realist, from a philosophical perspective, to defend the
critical importance of empirical work. Second, the apparent tension was addressed
by Quine who showed how, although material objects exist outside of our cognition
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of them, and although our cognition is based on concepts that make any claim to
truth impossible, we have no choice but to do our best to understand that reality in
light of our experience. To again quote from Quine, "As an empiricist I continue to
think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future
experience in the light of past experience…. But in point of epistemological footing,
the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of
entities enter our conceptions only as cultural posits."5
Third, and most importantly, Augsberg’s critique highlights the contributions
of the new legal realism, including in relation to the old legal realism. For some, the
old legal realism could be viewed as incorporating the social sciences, which
themselves were in relative infancy as disciplines, into the analysis of law. The new
legal realism, however, as Augsberg notes, places empiricism and pragmatism in
relationship with each other. As my initial article explained, the risk of empiricism is
scientisim, while the risk of pragmatism is relativism. The two keep each other in
check. Pragmatism keeps us vigilant that our conceptual priors can be misleading so
that we remainopen to revising them in light of new problems and contexts that we
encounter. Empiricism keeps us vigilant of the empirical grounding of ourpragmatic
interventions and aids us in evaluating them in light of their consequences.6
Augsberg attempts to counter the new legal realism’s commitment to
empirical study by questioning whether ‘reality’ is not simply a construction, and
contending that “fictitious scenarios can prove more relevant and reliable and in
this sense more ‘realistic’ than any so-called real thing.”7 To make his point,
Augsberg turns to a famous Henry James story, “The Real Thing,” in which a London
artist must make a series of illustrations of bourgeois figures for a book and is
approached by a bourgeois couple who have lost their income but propose to pose
for him as “the real thing.” He hires them but finally rejects them as models in favor
of a Cockney woman from East London and an Italian male immigrant because of
the greater suppleness of the latter in assuming the positions and attitudes that the
artist wishes to capture. The moral of the story is that the apparently “real thing”
may be less conducive for the making of representational art.
Augsberg captures the moral of the James story but he misses two key
aspects from a new legal realist perspective. First, what makes the story compelling
is not its “moral” but rather its characters, a middle aged couple who have lost their
material means and propose to be models and are willing to do anything in order to
retain their sense of identity as a gentleman and a lady. It is not the “idea” that
makes the story, but the compelling characters that underlie the idea. Second, and
most importantly, law is not artbecause the context, stakes, and consequences are
entirely different. As my initial essay stressed, for new legal realists, lawinvolves not
just reason, but also power. Unlike art, law has material (shall we say ‘real’),
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coercive consequences for individuals. The development and application of law
recognizes (or fails to recognize) rights and duties, and potentially strips individuals
of their assets and their liberty. The ‘real’ consequences of law mean something
different for a person in prison or (in the United States) on death row than a reader
of Henry James in a café, an armchair, or a bed.One can learn about law, society and
power from art, but individuals suffer consequences from the application of law,
including artists.
As a conceptualist, Augsberg questions what Andrew Lang (in his symposium
contribution) means by “in part” when Lang writes, “the categories we use to
apprehend the world are not natural but in part politically and socially
constructed.”8 The “in part” is critical because, unlike an approach based on a priori
thought, the new legal realism stresses the role of experience. It is the confluence
and interaction of concepts and experience in the world that matter.
When Augsberg turns to law he repeats the traditional positivist critique of
legal realism that legal realism’s main claim is that “law is constituted by decisions,
meaning judicial decisions. But as I explained in my initial article, the core interest
of legal realists is not in the question of ‘what is law,’ but rather in the question of
how law operates — how it obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes. When asking
those questions, attention to legal decisions becomes important, although judicial
decisions are just part of a much broader legal process. To understand how
international law obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes, one must look to more
than judicial decisions.
Augsberg, writing from an internal perspective on law which stresses formal
legal arguments before judges and judge’s formal reasoning regarding the law,
contends that “rules, not facts, come first,”9 and that “law comes ‘after the fact,’ thus
creating its own causes.”10 In both cases, he wishes to stress the priority of concepts
in constructing reality. Augsberg’s remarks make clear the political and social
dimensions of law, but not the priority of abstract rules themselves. From an
internal perspective, a legal practitioner advancing a client’s interests has choices
regarding how to present facts so that certain rules are applied as opposed to others,
and so that these rules will more likely be interpreted in particular ways in light of
the context. The lawyer and judicial decision-maker can select among facts to affect
a legal decision, which supports the legal realist point. From an external perspective,
law is a continuous, not a static, phenomenon. It develops through practice,
involving the interaction of concepts and experience.
The problem with Augsberg’s anti-empirical, purely conceptual approach is
revealed in his diction. He uses italics to stress the importance of the idea that “the
law presents itself” (i.e. that concepts are prior). But the law is not an agent and
cannot present itself. Even before traditional courts, law can only be presented by
lawyers making arguments on behalf of clients who have interests, and by judges
justifying their decisions in terms of what the law is and thus affecting those
interests. These agents work within a particular institutional context so that certain
arguments count and others do not. But those arguments concern not only
interpretations of the law; they also concern characterizations of the facts to know
Ibid., fn. 20.
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which law to apply and how to apply it. Legal realists wish to understand these
agents and their role in law’s construction, interpretation, practice, and effects
within the legal field, as well as in the broader social world.
Augsberg turns to Kant and Kelsen to contend that “different forms of
cognition [such as the is and the ought] depend on different transcendental schemes
and categories.”11 Here, some legal realists will raise an eyebrow because the
material objects and consequences of law do not simply “depend on different
transcendental schemes;” rather people are killed, raped, tortured, silenced,
stripped of their assets, denied access to health care; they pay taxes, have their
goods blocked at the border; some become ludicrously rich and others lose hope; air
and water become soiled, causing cancer, or they become cleansed and people live
longer and healthier lives. While Felix Cohen wrote about formalism’s
“transcendental nonsense,”12 the same can be leveled at the privileged distancing of
some postmodernist theory. And yet, at the same time, a new legal realist recognizes
the importance of conceptual and normative thought and of formalist doctrine in the
study of law and their interaction with experience. It is just that these approaches
alone are insufficient for getting at the questions that new legal realists ask since, for
a legal realist, knowledge comes from human experience, and concepts should be
developed and revised over time in light of that experience.
In the end, Augsberg calls for a new concept of law that comes out of legal
realist inquiry, one that is aware of its own limitations but nonetheless adds a new
framework though which “‘empirical’ findings can be properly understood and
integrated into the legal process.”13But for legal realists, a concept, such as a concept
of law, should not come from theory alone, but from theory informed by experience.
There is thus no trans-historical concept of law for all places and all time. Concepts
are adopted and adapted because they are useful for purposes of human
interventions in the world. Thus, such a concept cannot be derived by those (like
Augsberg) who stress the “priority of conceptual thinking.” Perhaps a new concept
will emerge out of new legal realist study, but it will be a concept that operates
within a particular context.
Let us now turn to Klabbers’ rather disenchanted, world-weary, have-seen-itall comment, Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New Legal Realism.
The main theme of Klabbers, known for his defense of legal positivism and distrust
of interdisciplinary exchange,14 is not so much about new legal realism as about any
new method, any new theory, any new academic approach to law, from Gramscian
critical theory to the Yale policy school, which he views as fads that will “come to
rest in the graveyard of academic fashions.”15At one point, Klabbers divides
scholarship into formalism and critical theory, and appears comfortable with critical
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theory because of its focus on theory and formal doctrine rather than experience
and socio-legal inquiry. Yet his response about fads goes counter to a great tradition
in Europe and the United States with which new legal realism links, that of sociolegal theory. The new legal realism is not some fad, but has deep jurisprudential
roots, constituting a third stream of jurisprudence involvingthe development of
socio-legal theory—in distinction to that of analytic philosophy, reflected in legal
positivism, and normative philosophy, reflected in natural law theory and Ronald
Dworkin’s interpretivism. It may be that with academic fashion, there will be a turn
away from problem-solving and our experience in the world. But the human
demand for law, for the pursuit of order and justice, will require engagement with
our experience. The new legal realism may, at some point, go under another name,
but the problems and the approach will remain.
When Klabbers turns to the new legal realism, his central comment concerns
“what ‘empirical’ stands for.”16 Here he expresses a common misunderstanding of
what empirical means, perhaps understandably with the turn to almost exclusively
quantitative work in the “empirical legal studies” movement in the United States.17
Klabbers first addresses quantitative work and then notes that at least one of the
symposium’s contributors, Mikael Madsen, “often resorts to interviews” which “too
counts as empirical,” so that “clearly the term ‘empirical means different things to
different people.”18 Yet, the term empirical is not synonymous with quantitative
methods. Rather, empirical has an accepted dictionary definition, which is
knowledge derived from observation and experience, differentiated from
knowledge based on theory. To take from two leading dictionaries, one English and
the other American, “empirical” means (i) “Based on, guided by, or employing
observation and experiment rather than theory”(New Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary, 5th ed.), and (ii) “originating in or based on observation or experience”
(Merriam-WebsterDictionary). Quantitative methods are simply a tool to evaluate
and understand experience, as are interviews with insiders, and ethnographic
observation.
Klabbers particularly critiques quantitative work, raising the challenge of
‘aggregation’ which tends to flatten facts through their categorization; and the
challenge of representation, quoting Benjamin Disraeli’s dismissive “lies, damned
lies, and statistics.”19 I too, as a new legal realist, have critiqued the risks of
quantitative analysis, as all empirical approaches. Yet, as the pragmatist contends,
all knowledge is imperfect so that we should engage with empirical work, and not
simply dismiss it in orderto build better understanding of law’s operation when
applying, adapting, and reforming it. More generally, Klabbers appears to question
the value of empirical work generally, to which the empiricist responds that
decisions and certainties ungrounded in empirics are dangerous, unpredictable, and
can have disastrous consequences. Witness the second war in Iraq initiated in 2003.
There the legal justifications were based on false and biased factual claims.
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Klabbers raises the question of “what” the empirics should study, and notes
that “empirical scholarship ends up concentrating rather too much on compliance”20
and issues of high politics. For new legal realists, empirics should not be modeldriven (of interest to legal theory), but rather problem-driven (of interest to
intervening in the world through law), and thus their focus tends to be on
effectiveness, not on compliance. Such empirics can address any subject area, from
human rights to business and regulatory law. It is the enlarged scope of
international law across all domains of social life that makes possible a new legal
realist approach because international law now implicatesalmost all domains of
social decision making. Socio-legal theory thus must take greater account of it. The
key for understanding the place of international lawinvolves much deeper questions
than compliance, and includes the broader impact of international law on national
institutions, professions, norms, and practices, as well as, in turn, the latters’
recursive impact on the development of formal international law.21
Finally, Klabbers asks “cui bono?”22 What’s in it for whom? “Cui bono” is a
fundamental question that a new legal realist asks about the legal system itself, but
Klabbers turns the question on those who deploy empirical methods. I have three
responses. First, conventionally lawyers think in terms of advocacy for clients and
thus the strategic use of empirical work. Empiricists and pragmatists, in contrast,
stress the importance of working to eliminate bias, even if it is impossible to reach a
wholly neutral stance. This is particularly important when we operate under
significant uncertainty regarding the reliability of our priors and the consequences
of our interventions.
Second, as Dewey insisted from the position of philosophical pragmatism, we
should only have ends in view so that learning can occur, enabling what Victoria
Nourse and I refer to as emergent analytics.23 In a world of uncertainty in which we
must make decisions, decisions are likely to be improved if they are informed by
experience. Certainly there are strategic actors who can manipulate empirics for
particular ends (“lies, damned lies, and statistics”). But those advocating empirics in
scholarship take a much humbler stance. Empirics can be abused and so the
responsibility of the researcher is not to manipulate statistics to make a
counterintuitive point to advancehis or her academic career. It is rather to engage in
the world of uncertainty to uncover what is otherwise ignored, especially by the
high priests of theory and formalism, not because the latter are irrelevant, but
because they and their prescriptionsmay be all too relevant and seriously impact
societies and individual lives.
Third, I suspect (although such itself is an empirical question) that empirical
work, on average, should bring to the fore the concerns of those who are otherwise
less likely to be heard, starting with ethnographic work, but also more broadly. The
well-heeled and connected can organize to have their views reflected at the
international level, whether they be countries such as the United States and China,
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regional organizations such as the European Union, or multinational companies
such as Citibank, Disney, Shell, Siemens, and Tata. Those with few resources tend to
be ignored. Thus much of my scholarship, building indeed from interviews, has been
to learn from the experiences of developing countries and their stakeholders to
inform debates that occur in Geneva and in the primary academic journals in the
United States and Europe that tend to publish authors from the United States and
Europe. Empirical research will often uncover the workings of power and bias that
otherwise are not addressed by formalist approaches.
Klabbers concludes by noting the importance of keeping lines of
communication open. That is the way I opened my initial article and will conclude
this Rejoinder. There is no one way of scholarship. Formal scholarship is important,
bothfor advocates and judges, because it addresses judges’ internal perspectives in
applying law that can have real implications on people’s lives. Conceptual and
normative analysis is important for orienting our perspectives and our
interventions in the world. And the new legal realism is critical for emphasizing the
interaction between the experiential and the conceptual to understand how law
obtains meaning, is practiced, and changes in order to inform law’s application and
reform to advance human ends. As I began, what interests new legal realists is
developing tools to understand and build theory regarding the development and
operation of law so that we can more effectively pursue our ends, ends that must
remain ends-in-view so that we are open to learning from our experience and are
not trapped by our conceptual priors.
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